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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 24, 1992, at approximately 4:28 a.m., Hurricane
Andrew slammed into South Florida packing winds greater than 160
miles per hour.' Damage from the storm was estimated at over 20 bil-
lion dollars, making it the largest natural disaster in United States his-
tory.2 In the wake of the hurricane, insurance companies asserted their
rights under the "Ordinance or Law" exclusions found in the insurance
contracts of at least three thousand homeowners in south Dade County.
To these homeowners, the "Ordinance or Law" exclusion was almost as
devastating as Andrew.
Most homeowner insurance policies contain an "Ordinance or
1. THE BIG ONE: HURRICANE ANDREW 12-13 (Roman Lyskowski & Steve Rice eds., 1992).
2. Id. at 8.
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Law" exclusion that excludes from coverage costs resulting from the
"enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating the construction, repair
or demolition of a building or other structure," unless specifically pro-
vided for in the policy.' At first glance, the exclusion appears to be
harmless; however, on closer examination, and when applied to a real
set of facts, its devastating effect becomes frighteningly apparent.
Although the idea for this Comment arose from the aftermath of
Hurricane Andrew, this analysis could easily apply to other situations
anywhere in the country. Every home or building owner in the country
could be affected by the Ordinance or Law exclusion, which can have a
devastating effect on the naive, unwary, or unsuspecting home or build-
ing owner.
This Comment examines the Ordinance or Law exclusion as it
relates to the repair of homes damaged by Hurricane Andrew. Specifi-
cally, this Comment focuses on legal and doctrinal arguments that
potentially obligate insurance companies to pay for building code
upgrades.4 Section II defines the Ordinance or Law exclusion and ana-
lyzes reasons espoused by the insurance industry to support its use. Sec-
tion III discusses problems created by the building code after Hurricane
Andrew. Section IV examines the "reasonable expectation" doctrine
and presents arguments which suggest that Florida should adopt the doc-
trine. Section V discusses how insurance companies could be made to
pay for code upgrades pursuant to section 211 of the Second Restate-
ment of Contracts. Section VI explains the "efficient proximate cause"
rule which Florida has applied in cases of concurrent causation to defeat
an insurer's contention that an excluded loss is not covered when com-
bined with a covered loss. Section VII analyzes cases and articles deal-
ing with the "total constructive loss" doctrine as it relates to the
"Ordinance or Law" exclusion and suggests that this doctrine, when
used in conjunction with Florida's "valued policy" law, renders the
exclusion unenforceable.
3. See, e.g., Your STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, Special Form 3, at 10 (Dec. 1990)
(on file with the author). Some policies also contain a provision which provides that the insurer
"will not pay for any increased costs resulting from enforcement of any ordinance or law
regulating the construction, repair or demolition of a building unless specifically provided under
this policy." Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
4. This contention could also be supported with a contra proferente approach (i.e., the
provision could be constituted most strongly against the drafter). However, "a result placed not
squarely upon inequity, but upon interpretation, seems sure to produce continuing uncertainty in
the law of insurance contracts." Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 603 (2d
Cir. 1972).
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II. THE "ORDINANCE OR LAW" EXCLUSION
A typical Ordinance or Law exclusion clause reads: "We do not
cover loss ... resulting in any manner from ... Enforcement of any
ordinance or law regulating the construction, reconstruction, mainte-
nance, repair or demolition of buildings or other structures." '5 The insur-
ance industry has articulated several reasons for the exclusion.
However, as discussed below, the reasons fail to explain the distinction
between costs of complying with the building codes and costs associated
with coverage under "Replacement Cost" policies, which are fairly stan-
dard in today's market.
Insurance companies most frequently state that the purpose of the
exclusion is to prevent an insured from obtaining a "windfall" through
the enforcement of a local or state ordinance or law. For example, in
Bradford v. Home Insurance Co.,6 the insured sustained damage to his
leaching field.7 The cost of replacing the field with material similar to
the original would have been $1,000.8 However, a local ordinance
required that the insured also install a septic tank at a cost of $2,300. 9
The insurer denied coverage for the cost of the tank based on an Ordi-
nance or Law exclusion in the insured's policy and the court upheld the
insurer's decision.10
Another court articulated the purpose of the exclusion as follows:
[T]he insurer is required.., to indemnify the insured for the cost of
repairing or replacing a building which was lost or destroyed by fire
with materials of like kind and quality, but it is not required to
assume repair or replacement costs which would provide the insured
with a more structurally valuable building than the one that was dam-
aged or destroyed.... The owners of new buildings which conform
with state or local building laws are merely reimbursed for costs
which they actually incurred. On the other hand, the owner of build-
ings which do not conform with such laws are not permitted to
recover costs which they never assumed in the first place."
Such windfalls, however, are inherent in "replacement cost" policies,
which obligate insurers to reimburse the insured for the actual cost of
repairs and construction without deducting any amount for deprecia-
tion.'2 For example, if an insured needed to replace a damaged roof, the
5. ALLSTATE DELUXE PLUS HOMEOWNERS POLICY 6-7 (on file with the author).
6. 384 A.2d 52 (Me. 1978).
7. Id. at 53.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Breshears v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967).
12. "Replacement cost" has been defined as: "The estimated cost to construct, at current
1994]
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insurer would be liable for the cost of the entire new roof, even if the
damaged roof had been 10 years old. This begs the question: why is
paying to replace a 10 year old roof with a new roof less objectionable
than paying to replace a home built under an old building code with a
home that complies with a current building code?
Insurers also justify the exclusion by stating that they must limit
their exposure to the risk of having to pay for costs that are uncertain.
Moreover, insurer's claim that it is expensive to keep track of, and prop-
erly estimate, the impact of building codes. Ironically, uncertainty cre-
ated the need for insurance in the first place and inspires many
homeowners to purchase insurance. The basic purpose of insurance is to
pool and distribute the risk of uncertain losses over a large number of
people so that an individual will not bear the entire impact of a loss.
Who better to evaluate and spread risk than insurance companies?
Because insurance companies have the knowledge and ability to
pool and spread risk, and because ordinances and laws, e.g., building
codes, are enacted for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, the
following questions must be asked: Why is coverage of building code
upgrades not automatically included in insurance policies? Why have
insurance companies fought so ardently to support the exclusions despite
the fact that courts have been ambivalent toward the exclusions? The
fact that some individuals may benefit from an increase in the value of
their property because of an upgrade required by an ordinance or law is
unimportant when weighed against the potentially devastating effect the
exclusions can have when they are enforced.
III. HURRICANE ANDREW AND THE CODE UPGRADE PROBLEM
Every state and local government has enacted laws and ordinances
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Many of these
laws address the construction or repair of buildings and other structures.
Local building codes can and do regulate everything from where a build-
ing can be built to what kind of nails can be used. South Florida and,
more specifically, south Dade County, Florida, has two such codes: the
Dade County Code' 3 and the South Florida Building Code."4
Dade County enacted Chapter 11-C of the Dade County Code (the
"Code") to take advantage of the national flood program administered
prices, a building with utility equivalent to the building being appraised, using modern materials
and current standards, design, and layout." AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS,
THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 256 (1984).
13. DADE COUNTY, FLA., BUILDING CODE § I IC (1987) [(DADE COUNTY BUILDING CODE)].
14. SOUTH FLORIDA, FLA., BUILDING CODE ch. 104 (1988) [(SoUTH FLA. BUILDING CODE)].
[Vol. 48:949
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by the federal government.15 Homes which were built prior to the enact-
ment of the Code and were below the flood levels established by the
federal program did not have to be immediately in compliance with the
Code provisions.16 However, a home located in a flood area which sus-
tains damage and requires "substantial improvement"' 7 must be elevated
to the level required under the Code.' Moreover, the construction
materials and methods used to repair or rebuild the home must minimize
flood damage.19
To remain eligible for the federal flood insurance program, Dade
County must continue to comply with the Code and any additional
requirements imposed upon the county by the Federal Flood program. 0
A violation of the Code could result in a fine of five hundred dollars,
imprisonment of not more than sixty days, or both, for each day that
such violation continues to exist.21 Violations of the Code could also
result in "any legal action necessary, such as application to any court for
injunctive relief, revocation of any building permit issued[,] or other
appropriate means. '22  Conceivably, "other appropriate means" could
include demolition of a home or structure that was repaired in violation
of the Code. The possibility that a demolition order could be issued by a
governmental agency significantly effects the current statutory and case
law dealing with the Ordinance or Law exclusion.
The South Florida Building Code23 provides that repairs costing
less than fifty percent of the replacement value of the existing building
15. DADE COUNTY BUILDING CODE, supra note 14, § I1C-I. The Code was enacted so that
the county could obtain flood insurance coverage under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.
Id. As a result of the Code, "the Federal Insurance Administration declared the entire area of
Dade County eligible for federally assisted flood insurance, which insurance will mitigate the
effects of damages from such natural disasters as hurricanes and severe storms and their attendant
flooding." Id.
16. Id. § I1C-16.
17. "Substantial improvement" means:
any combination of repairs, reconstruction, alteration, or improvements to a
structure, taking place during the life of a structure (a fifty-year period), in which
the cumulative cost equals or exceeds fifty (50) percent of the market value of the
structure. The market value of the structure shall be (1) the appraised value of the
structure prior to the start of the initial repair or improvement, or (2) in the case of
damage, the value of the structure prior to the damage occurring. "Substantial
improvement" is considered to occur when the first alteration of any wall, ceiling,
floor, or other structural part of the building commences, whether or not that
alteration affects the external dimensions of the structure.
Id. § IC-2(f.
18. Id. § I IC-5(a)-(b).
19. Id. § I IC-3(b)(l)-(2).
20. Id. § lIC-l.
21. Id. § 11C-15(a).
22. Id. § I IC-15(b) (emphasis added).
23. SOUTH FLA. BUILDING CODE, supra note 14.
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must comply with the current building code.24 However, the entire
building does not have to be altered to comply. On the other hand,
repairs costing more than fifty percent of the replacement value of the
existing building must conform to "all the requirements for a new build-
ing or structure or be entirely demolished. '2 5
According to several estimates, at least three thousand homeowners
in Dade County could not obtain building permits to rebuild homes dam-
aged by Hurricane Andrew because their homes were below federal
flood levels.26 In order to rebuild and to comply with federal flood
guidelines, these owners must raise the foundation of their home by sev-
eral feet.27 The cost to raise a two thousand square foot house by several
feet could easily exceed thirty thousand dollars.28 In addition, many
South Florida residents whose homes were damaged by Andrew must
comply with the current South Florida Building Code when rebuilding.29
The latest estimates suggest that the construction costs associated with
building upgrades could exceed ninety million dollars.30
Therefore, the legality of the Ordinance or Law exclusion is of sig-
nificant socio-economic importance to the residents of South Florida and
to others around the country who might find themselves similarly situ-
ated after a natural disaster. If the exclusion is allowed to stand, its cost
will be borne by those who can least afford it: the individual home-
owner. Unfortunately, many homeowners will not be able to afford the
costs and will be forced to abandon their homes. This could ultimately
result in the demolition of the home or structure as a nuisance and would
seriously threaten neighborhoods and communities as we know them.
IV. THE "REASONABLE EXPECTATION" DOCTRINE
Insurance companies, relying on the Ordinance or Law exclusion,
offer to settle claims for the amount of the actual damage only; they
disregard both elevation costs and the fact that the home cannot be
rebuilt until it is elevated. Therefore, although claims are paid, insureds
do not receive what they thought they would get: a functional home.
They find they do not own what they thought they purchased: a policy
that would cover the cost of repairing their homes to a functional condi-
24. Id. § 104.3(d).
25. Id. § 104.3(e) (emphasis added).
26. Don Fine Frock, Insurance Could Pay to Elevate Houses, MiAmt HERALD, Nov. 18, 1992,
at IA.
27. Id.
28. Id. at IIA.
29. SotrrH FLA. BUILDING CODE, supra note 15, at § 104.3.
30. Frock, supra note 26, at I IA.
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tion. It is this expectation that forms the basis of the "reasonable expec-
tation" doctrine.
The reasonable expectation doctrine has been written about exten-
sively.3' However, this Comment limits the discussion and analysis of
the doctrine to a basic overview of the principals underlying and sup-
porting the doctrine: an illustration of the doctrine applied and a discus-
sion of how and why Florida courts could adopt the doctrine.
A. Contracts of Adhesion
Generally, adhesion contracts are "standard form contracts
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 32 Unequal bargaining power is
inferred in insurance contracts because the insured is universally
presented a form contract which allows little, if any, negotiation or
choice over the terms or provisions. The Supreme Court of Arizona
described the adhesive nature of a typical insurance contract when it
stated that an insurance contract:
[i]s not a contract arrived at by negotiation between the parties. The
insured is given no choice regarding terms and conditions of cover-
age which are contained on forms which the insured seldom sees
before purchase of the policy, which often are difficult to understand,
and which usually are neither read nor expected to be read by either
the person who sells the policy or the person who buys it.33
Recently, a trend developed recognizing that contracts of adhesion
are different from "ordinary" contracts and that they should be treated
31. See, e.g., Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance
Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 823-24 nn.6-8 (1990) (listing over 40 articles on
the reasonable expectation doctrine).
32. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1173, 1174 (1983). Rakoff described a "contract of adhesion" as follows:
1. The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains
many terms and clearly purports to be a contract.
2. The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction.
3. The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented
by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine.
4. The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except
perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party
will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document.
This representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is
understood by the adherent.
5. After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the
document is signed by the adherent.
6. The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by the
form-few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
7. The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a
whole is the payment of money.
33. Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 282 (Ariz. 1987) (quoting
Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441, 446 (Ariz. 1982)).
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differently.34 In fact, the Second Restatement of Contracts includes a
separate section which specifically addresses contracts of adhesion.35
Moreover, at least one commentator believes that "the form terms pres-
ent in contracts of adhesion ought to be considered presumptively
(although not absolutely) unenforceable. 36
Because insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion,37 the rules
governing insurance contracts warrant special consideration. Contracts
of adhesion are treated differently than negotiated contracts and the rea-
sonable expectation doctrine constitutes one attempt by the courts to
address that difference by re-leveling the playing field.
B. Overview of the Doctrine
The nature of contracting has changed to such an extent that it is no
longer practical for a court to rely on many traditional principals of con-
tract law when resolving conflicts between parties. Many of the tradi-
tional methods for resolving contract disputes "were formulated at an
early time when parties of equal strength negotiated in the historical
sequence of offer, acceptance, and reduction to writing. 38
Once insurance contracts were identified as contracts of adhesion,
decisions in insurance cases initially were difficult to reconcile with
then-existing contract law. 39 The aphorism used to explain such deci-
sions was simply: "It's an insurance case.' 40 On closer examination,
however, it appeared that those decisions were based on similar "cur-
rents of principle."'" They shared a common rationale.
These principles, now recognized as the "reasonable expectation"
doctrine, were first identified by Judge Robert E. Keeton in an article
written while he was a professor at Harvard University.42 Professor
Keeton's formulation of the doctrine provided that "[t]he objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regard-
ing the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though pains-
34. Rakoff, supra note 32, at 1174.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). Insurance contracts are
unquestionably contracts of adhesion. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (1970).
36. Rakoff, supra note 32, at 1176.
37. Keeton, supra note 35.
38. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 1975); see also
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) ("The contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers as
typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire agreement, is no
longer of much more than historical importance.").
39. See Keeton, supra note 35.
40. Id. at 961.
41. Id.
42. Keeton, supra note 35.
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taking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations. 43
Insurance policies are typically long and complicated documents
that are difficult to read and comprehend. It is recognized that most
insureds do not even read their insurance policies. 44 Consequently, an
insured might first learn of an exclusion or limitation on coverage only
when he or she suffers a loss and the insurer denies coverage.
Several respected commentators believe not only that insureds do
not read their policies, but also that no one should reasonably expect
them to.45 It is the insured's lack of understanding of the policy terms
and the insurer's opportunity to draft policy terms unreasonably
favorable to themselves that forms the basis for honoring the "objec-
tively reasonable expectations" of the insured.4
The doctrine may also apply where the language in the policy is
clear and unambiguous 47 "even if careful examination of the policy pro-
vision would negate [a particular] expectation. ' 48 However, some courts
use the doctrine only where the policy language is ambiguous. Under
the reasonable expectation doctrine, the meaning of a term in an insur-
ance contract is not what the drafter intended it to mean, but what a
reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood
43. Id. at 967. Keeton expounded on this principal by stating that:
First, as an ideal this principal incorporates the proposition that policy language will
be construed as laymen would understand it and not according to the interpretation
of sophisticated underwriters. Arguably that proposition should be regarded as a
corollary of the principle of resolving ambiguities against the insurer. The principle
of honoring reasonable expectations should be extended further, protecting the
policyholder's expectations as long as they are objectively reasonable from the
layman's point of view, in spite of the fact that had he made a painstaking study of
the contract, he would have understood the limitation that defeats the expectations at
issue.
Id. at 967.
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981) (The insurer does
not expect the insured "to understand or even to read the standard terms.").
45. See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559, at 266 (1960) ("He may
not even read the policy, the number of its terms and the fineness of its print being such as to
discourage him."); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 906B, at 300
(3rd ed. 1963) ("[W]here the document thus delivered to him is a contract of insurance the
majority rule is that the insured is not bound to know its contents.").
46. See Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IOWA L. REV.
843, 844 (1960) ("[S]tandardized form contracts are never read by the party who 'adheres' to
them.... [T]he proponent of the form is free to dictate terms most advantageous to himself.").
47. See Keeton, supra note 35, at 968 ("[T]hose expectations should prevail as well when the
language of an unusual provision is clearly understandable."). See also Gordinier v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283 (Ariz. 1986); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975).
48. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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it to mean. 49 Therefore, in construing the ambiguity against the insurer
and in favor of the insured, some courts look to the "objectively reason-
able expectations" of the insured to fashion a remedy.50
In Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,51 the Supreme Court
of Arizona analyzed cases and authorities dealing with the reasonable
expectation doctrine and described four situations in which it would not
enforce disputed terms in an insurance policy:
1. Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court,
cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer who
might check on his or her rights, the court will interpret them in light
of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average insured;
2. Where the insured did not receive full and adequate notice of the
term in question, and the provision is either unusual or unexpected, or
one that emasculates apparent coverage;
3. Where some activity can be reasonably attributed to the insurer
would create an objective impression of coverage in the mind of a
reasonable insured;
4. Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has
induced a particular insured reasonably to believe that he has cover-
age, although such coverage is expressly and unambiguously denied
by the policy.52
Courts in thirty-one states and the District of Columbia recognize
the reasonable expectation doctrine;53 only three states have rejected it.54
One commentator strongly believes that the doctrine will continue to
gain support in the remaining jurisdictions. 55
C. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co. 56
In C & J Fertilizer, the plaintiff purchased two insurance policies to
49. Macon Light House Revival Ctr., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 417, 420
(M.D. Ga. 1987).
50. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174-75 (Cal. 1966); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985); Gowing v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 483 P.2d
1072, 1075 (Kan. 1971); Woodson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 743 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Ky.
1987).
51. 742 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1987).
52. Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted).
53. BARRY R. OSTRAOER, INSuRANCjE COVERAGE DispuTus 19 (1993) (Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). Id. at 19-23.
54. Id. at 24 (Illinois, Ohio, and Idaho).
55. Henderson, supra note 31, at 834.
56. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). This case illustrates one situation in which the doctrine
can apply.
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cover loss at his fertilizer plant.57 Both policies provided coverage for
burglaries but they defined burglary as "the felonious abstraction of
insured property (1) from within the premises by a person making felo-
nious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which force and
violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or
chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at
the place of such entry." 58 Ostensibly, this requirement was intended to
guard against "inside jobs."59 When the plant was burglarized, the
insurers denied coverage because there were no visible marks on the
exterior of the building. The insurer maintained this defense despite sig-
nificant evidence that the burglary was not an inside job.6 °
The court examined cases and treatises which addressed the adhe-
sive nature of modem standardized insurance contracts.61 The court
determined that "[i]t is generally recognized the insured will not read the
detailed, cross-referenced, standardized, mass-produced insurance form,
nor understand it if he does." '62 The court concluded, therefore, that "the
inevitable result of enforcing all provisions of the adhesion contract...
delivered subsequent to the transaction and containing provisions never
assented to, would be an abdication of judicial responsibility. 63
The court cited the Second Restatement of Contracts to support its
adoption of the reasonable expectation doctrine.' The court agreed with
the Restatement's approach that an insured should not be bound by a
term in an insurance contract if the insurer had reason to believe 65 that
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id. at 171.
59. Id. at 172.
60. Id. at 171-72. The insurance agent who sold the policy observed the crime scene and
expressed surprise that the insurer denied coverage. Id. at 171.
61. The court cited several authorities as follows:
"Few persons solicited to take policies understand the subject of insurance or the
rules of law governing the negotiations, and they have no voice in dictating the
terms of what is called the contract."... 7 Williston on Contracts § 900, pp. 29-30
(3d Ed. 1963). . . .7 Williston on Contracts § 906B, p. 300 ("But where the
document thus delivered to him is a contract of insurance the majority rule is that
the insured is not bound to know its contents"); 3 Corbin on Contracts § 559, pp.
265-66 ("One who applies for an insurance policy... may not even read the policy,
the number of its terms and the fineness of its print being such as to discourage
him") .... 7 Williston on Contracts § 900, pp. 33-34 ("Some courts, recognizing
that very few insureds even try to read and understand the policy or application,
have declared that the insured is justified in assuming that the policy which is
delivered to him has been faithfully prepared by the company to provide the
protection against the risk which he had asked for").
Id. at 174-76.
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 176.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. f(1981) ("Reason to believe may
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the insured would not have assented to that term if it had been brought to
the insured's attention.66 Consequently, the court refused to enforce the
unambiguous policy definition of burglary, stating that that definition
"which crept into [the] policy comport[ed] neither with the concept a
layman might have of that crime, nor with a legal interpretation. '67 The
court added that the definition of burglary in the policy made the
"insurer's obligation to pay turn on the skill of the burglar, not on the
event the parties bargained for: a bona-fide third party burglary result-
ing in loss of plaintiff's chemicals and equipment. ' 68  The court con-
cluded that, although the disputed language was unambiguous, the
insured had a reasonable expectation that a loss from a burglary would
be covered if burglary was not an inside job.69
D. The Florida Courts
The reasonable expectation doctrine has received little attention in
Florida. With few exceptions,7° it does not appear that the doctrine has
been fully discussed. 7' However, several courts and judges in Florida
have discussed some of the principles that underlie the doctrine.72
be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the
non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of
the transaction.").
66. Id. § 211(3).
67. C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 177.
68. Id.
The court noted that the reasonable expectation doctrine does not always work against the
insurer; it can and does work for the insurer in some cases. Id. (citing Central Bearing Co. v.
Wolverine Insurance Co., 179 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1970) (The court in Central Bearing reversed
the trial courts ruling that the language was ambiguous and stated that "we think the insured as a
reasonable person would understand the policy coverage purchased meant the insured was not
covered for loss if the 'accident' with concomitant damage to the victim occurred away from the
premises and after the operation and sale was complete.")).
69. Id. at 176-77.
70. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Hurtado, 587 So. 2d 1315, 1320-21 (Fla.
1991); Shuster v. South Broward Hosp., 570 So. 2d 1362, 1366 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Gathings v.
West Am. Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Spengler v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 568 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
71. See also Henderson, supra note 31, at 836 n.73 ("Research has not revealed any case
involving the issue that has reached the highest courts of Arkansas, Florida, and Tennessee.")
(emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., National Gypsum Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 417 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1982)
("(A]llowing recovery is the more equitable course of action and furthers the reasonable
expectations of those who purchase insurance."); Moncello v. Federal Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1081,
1083 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (Harris, J., dissenting) ("Unambiguous insurance contracts are enforced
in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured."); Galinko v. Aetna Casualty and
Sur. Co., 432 So. 2d 179, 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ("[A]doption of the modem rule of reasonable
expectations promotes the social function of insurance coverage."); McDaniel v. Lawyers' Title
Guar. Fund, 327 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) ("One of the reasonable expectations of a
policyholder who purchases title insurance is to be protected against defects in his title which
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On January 25, 1993, Dade County, Florida filed a complaint for
Declaratory Judgment against State Farm and Allstate Insurance compa-
nies to determine the legality of the Ordinance or Law exclusion.7 3 In
Florida, an insurance policy must be interpreted to provide coverage
whenever possible.74 Moreover, in Florida, exclusions are narrowly
interpreted against the insurer." The complaint filed by Dade County
presents an opportunity for Florida courts to formally adopt the reason-
able expectation doctrine. A decision to adopt the doctrine would have
an immediate effect on at least three thousand families whose homes
were destroyed by Hurricane Andrew.76 It is time for the courts in Flor-
ida to recognize the need for intervention. Judicial regulation of insur-
ance contracts as adhesion contracts is appropriate given the lack of
statutory and administrative controls and the considerable influence
insurers often have over legislative decisions.77
The Restatement approach, discussed above, provides a basis upon
which Florida courts could base a decision to adopt the doctrine.78 At
least two other jurisdictions have used section 211 of the Restatement to
justify adoption of the doctrine.7 9 In addition, the American Law Insti-
tute has recognized and supported the reasonable expectation doctrine.80
This support, combined with the fact that a majority of the jurisdictions
have now adopted the doctrine, provides significant justification for its
adoption in Florida.
Adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine to render the Ordi-
nance or Law exclusion unenforceable would require little effort. For
example, in Hertog v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 1 the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals commented that the adoption of the doctrine in
that state "afford[ed] Minnesota courts a standard to construe insurance
contracts without forced reliance on arbitrary rules 'which do not reflect
appear of record."); Osepchook v. Gateway Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
(Cross, J., dissenting) ("I am impelled to follow to [sic] a higher piper. It has always been my
belief that when members of the public purchase policies of insurance, they are entitled to the
broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations. This is what they
pay their premium for. They should not be subjected to narrow interpretations which afford no
coverage for premium dollars.").
73. The complaint was filed in the 11 th Judicial Circuit Court in and for Dade County,
Florida, case number 93-01307.
74. Sanz v. Reserve Ins. Co., 172 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1965).
75. Cochran v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
76. See supra text accompanying note 26.
77. Keeton, supra note 35, at 966-67.
78. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
79. Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984); C & J
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (Restatement § 237 has since
been renumbered as § 211.).
80. See Henderson, supra note 31, at 845 n. 10.
81. 415 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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real life situations and without having to bend and stretch those rules to
do justice in individual cases.' ",82
If Florida courts are concerned that adopting the doctrine might
"open the flood gates" of litigation, they could limit the application of
the doctrine to situations in which the expectations of the insured are
supported by substantial public policy reasons that affect the health,
safety and welfare of the public.
Even such a limited application would apply to the victims of Hur-
ricane Andrew. An insured whose home was damaged could reasonably
have expected that insurance would cover the cost of elevating and
repairing the home as required by local building codes; this expectation,
in turn, is supported by substantial public policies (e.g., continued fed-
eral funding). Therefore, by adopting the reasonable expectation doc-
trine, Florida courts could give effect to the objective and reasonable
expectations of the insureds, notwithstanding the unambiguous Ordi-
nance or Law exclusion which explicitly negates those expectations.
V. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211
The American Law Institute adopted section 211 of the Restate-
ment to deal with the inherent unfairness of standardized agreements,
while at the same time recognizing the need for such agreements. Sec-
tion 211 provides that:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating
alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party mani-
festing such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing con-
tained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.8 3
Pursuant to section 211, a standardized agreement will be enforced
whether or not the obligor read or understood the agreement unless the
obligee "has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term. ''8 4 Therefore, when an insurance contract is the subject of a dis-
pute, courts should interpret a particular term according to its plain
82. Id. at 373 (quoting Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271, 278 (Minn. 1985)).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
84. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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meaning unless the insurer had "reason to believe"85 that the insured
would not have agreed to the term if he or she was aware of the exist-
ence of that term in the policy.86
Some courts have stated that comment f of section 211 stands for
the same principles as those of the reasonable expectation doctrine. 87
However, the principles of section 211, as expounded in comment f,
appear to be more narrow than those of the reasonable expectation doc-
trine. For example, section 211 requires that the insurer have "reason to
believe" that the insured would not have accepted a particular term.8 In
contrast, the reasonable expectation doctrine, as it is currently under-
stood and applied, does not have such a requirement. As also stated in
comment f, however, the proof required to show that the insurer had
"reason to believe" could be inferred "from the fact that the term is
bizarre or oppressive, from that fact that it eviscerates the non-standard
terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the domi-
nant purpose of the transaction."89
Section 211 may be used alone, or with the reasonable expectation
doctrine, to render the Ordinance or Law exclusion unenforceable.
Courts should conclude that an insurer had reason to believe that an
insured would not have assented to the Ordinance or Law exclusion if
the exclusion, and the potential applicability of the fifty percent rule (of
which the insurer was undoubtedly aware), had been brought to the
attention of the insured. If insurance companies had informed their cli-
ents about the exclusion and about the availability of an Ordinance or
85. "Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive,
from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 211 cmt. f (1981).
86. Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283 (Ariz. 1987).
87. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975).
The text of comment f provides:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by
them without even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not
bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation....
[A] party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not assent to a term if
the other party has reason to believe that the adhering party would not have accepted
the agreement if he had known that the agreement contained the particular term....
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or
oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed
to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The
inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an opportunity to read the
term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from view. This rule is closely related
to the policy against unconscionable terms and the rule of interpretation against the
draftsman.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981).
89. Id.
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Law endorsement,90 homeowners could have either purchased extra cov-
erage or have decided not to enter into the agreement.
VI. THE "EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE" RULE
A. The Rule
The efficient proximate cause rule provides that "where there is
one cause which sets other causes in motion, there is coverage for the
loss if the cause which set others in motion is an included risk under
the terms of the policy. This is so even though there might be an
excluded risk which also contributed to the loss or damage." 91
Courts that have applied the "efficient proximate cause" rule have
held that an Ordinance or Law exclusion is inapplicable where the loss
was predominately caused by something other than the application of the
ordinance or law.9 2 For example, in Starczewski v. Unigard Insurance
Group,93 the Washington Court of Appeals used a "Loss Settlement"
provision in the contract and the efficient proximate cause rule to defeat
the Ordinance or Law exclusion. The "Loss Settlement" provision pro-
vided that "losses are settled at actual cash value at the time of loss but
not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged
property."94 The court reasoned that "the average person would believe
that 'the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged property'
includes the amount necessary to comply with mandatory building codes
enacted after the policy was issued."95 Accordingly, the court held that
the Ordinance or Law exclusion was inapplicable because of the effi-
cient proximate cause rule "since any additional repair costs due to code
requirements resulted predominately from the fire, not from the enforce-
ment of any ordinance or law."96
Several courts have concentrated solely on the proximate cause of a
90. An endorsement is optional coverage purchased at the election of the insured for an
additional premium. The endorsement typically covers costs associated with the application of
any "Ordinance or Law" that could effect the insured's property. Some insurance companies offer
this additional coverage but fail to properly market it. Beatrice E. Garcia, Agent Takes Issue with
State Farm, MiAMi HERALD, Sept. 11, 1992, at 81CA.
91. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 216 Cal. Rpt. 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1985); see also GEORGE J.
COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 74:711 (rev. ed. 1983) ("[I]n determining
whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of different causes,
the efficient cause-is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may
follow it, and operate more immediately in producing the disaster.").
92. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. 1989); Sabella
v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 896-97 (Cal. 1963) (where concurrent causes combine to produce a loss,
the efficient cause is the cause to which the loss is attributed).
93. 810 P.2d 58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
94. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 62.
96. Id.
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loss and have held that loss associated with an ordinance or law is
merely a secondary or consequential loss and therefore recoverable. For
example, in Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company v. Oakland,97
the Supreme Court of Montana held that an Ordinance or Law exclu-
sion9" did not apply to costs associated with removal of asbestos from a
building damaged by fire.99 The court reasoned that the regulation
which required the removal of the asbestos "did not 'cause' or 'result in'
'loss or damage' to the insured property [and that it was] the fire that
caused the 'loss or damage' to the insured property."' 00
Several courts have recently decided that Ordinance or Law exclu-
sions apply only when loss is solely and directly attributable to the Ordi-
nance or Law. In Garnett v. Transamerica Insurance Services,'0' the
Supreme Court of Idaho held that the exclusion applied only when the
loss was caused solely by the ordinance or law. 102 The court reasoned
that:
if some safety improvement of a building to which no other loss
occurred were required by an ordinance or law, Transamerica would
not be liable. However, when the cost of repairing or replacing a
building that had been damaged by fire is increased by the require-
ments of an ordinance or law, Transamerica is not relieved of that
cost. 10
3
B. The Florida Courts
Courts in Florida have recognized and adopted the efficient proxi-
mate cause rule. The courts, therefore, could rely on this rule alone to
render the Ordinance or Law exclusion inapplicable to the elevation
requirement confronted by victims of Hurricane Andrew. In Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Phelps,'°4 a leak from an underground
water-pipe damaged the plaintiffs home. 0 5 While the plaintiff was try-
ing to repair the damage, the house settled and caused additional dam-
age. 10 6 The policy provided coverage for damage caused by leaking
97. 825 P.2d 554 (Mont. 1992).
98. The exclusion provided that coverage did "not apply to loss or damage caused by or
resulting from: 1. Enforcement of any ordinance or law, either directly or indirectly, regulating
the construction, repair or demolition of buildings or structures." Id. at 555.
99. Id. at 556-57.
100. Id. at 556.
101. 800 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1990).
102. Id. at 666.
103. Id.
104. 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
105. Id. at 363.
106. Id.
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pipes but excluded damage caused by settling or cracking.' 07 The court
held that because the leak in the plumbing system was the proximate and
efficient cause of the loss, the exclusion regarding settling was
inapplicable. '0
In Wallach v. Rosenberg,10 9 a storm caused the defendant's sea
wall to collapsed which, in turn, caused a portion of the plaintiff's sea
wall to collapse."10 A jury determined that weather and the defendant's
failure to properly maintain the wall caused the collapse. " The plain-
tiff's insurance policy provided coverage for damage caused by the neg-
ligent acts of others but contained an exclusion for loss caused by earth
movement or water damage." 2 The insurer denied coverage, arguing
that the proximate cause of the loss was the water pressure caused by the
storm and that therefore the loss was not covered under the policy."'
The insurer also argued that where concurrent causes combine to cause a
loss and one of the causes is a loss that is excluded under an insurance
policy, the insured should not recover."14 The plaintiff argued that the
loss was caused by the defendant's negligence and was therefore cov-
ered under the policy." 5 Experts on both sides testified that if the
defendant had properly maintained his wall, the collapse would not have
occurred.1 6 The court held that an insured may recover even when "the
insured risk [is] not ... the prime or efficient cause of the accident.""' 7
Moreover, the court held that the insured could recover for the total loss
even though a contributing cause of the loss was excluded in the
policy. " 8
VII. THE "CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL Loss" DOCTRINE
The "constructive total loss" doctrine provides that a loss will be
considered a total loss when the requirements of an ordinance or law
prevent the insured from rebuilding or repairing the damaged struc-
107. Id.
108. Id. at 364.
109. 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
110. Id. at 1386.
111. Id. at 1387.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting 11 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 44:268 (rev. ed. 1982)); see also
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123, 129 (Cal. 1973).
118. Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1388. Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 454 N.E.2d 1156,
1160 (I1. App. Ct. 1983) ("Where a policy expressly insures against loss covered by another risk,
coverage is extended to a loss caused by the insured risk even though the excluded risk is a
contributory cause.").
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ture.119  Generally, when a governmental agency, acting pursuant to
authority or law, prohibits the repair of a partially damaged structure,
courts hold an Ordinance or Law exclusion inapplicable because the
ordinance or law renders the structure a "constructive total loss."' 20 In
such a case, governmental action, in effect, renders the building a total
loss even though repairs to the structure may be physically and economi-
cally feasible. Moreover, even if the ordinance or law merely renders an
insured's property impractical (either physically or economically) to
repair, courts should consider the structure a constructive total loss for
which the Ordinance or Law exclusion should be inapplicable and unen-
forceable. This rule should apply, particularly when the added cost of
repair attributed to the ordinance or law does not result in a windfall to
the insured. In other words, and in view of the stated purpose of the
exclusion, when the costs associated with an ordinance or law do not
directly benefit or increase the value of the insured's property, the exclu-
sion should not apply.121
For example, as stated above, Hurricane Andrew has left over three
thousand homeowners unable to get building permits to rebuild their
homes unless they elevate their homes as required under the building
codes. The cost of compliance renders impractical the repair of many of
these homes. Courts should apply the total constructive loss doctrine
and determine that the Ordinance or Law exclusion does not apply in
this case. The homeowners will not reap a windfall from such a ruling;
rather, they will regain their homes.
A. Overview of the Doctrine
In 1903, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts applied the construc-
tive total loss doctrine in Hewins v. London Assurance Corp. 122 Hewins
involved a consolidated action against twelve insurance companies. It
addressed the issue of whether an insurer's liability included the cost of
repairing a building which had been damaged by fire and which was
119. Stahlberg v. Travelers Indem. Co., 568 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). The history
of the constructive total loss doctrine can be traced to maritime law. The doctrine was developed
to alleviate the harsh requirement of an "actual total loss" where the cost of repairs would exceed
the repaired value of the ship. The doctrine enabled the insured to abandon the vessel as if it were
a total loss thereby entitling the insurer to the salvage value rights. Lenfest v. Coldwell, 525 F.2d
717, 724 (2d Cir. 1975).
120. See Feinbloom v. Camden Fire Insurance Association, 149 A.2d 616, 618 (N.J Super. Ct.
App. Div., 1959); Stahlberg v. Travelers, 568 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Stevick v.
Northwest, 281 N.,W.2d 60, 62 (N.D. 1979); Hertog v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 415
N.W.2d 370, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (1993).
122. 68 N.E. 62 (Mass. 1903).
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subject to specific building laws. 123 On the general measure of dam-
ages, the court stated:
Ordinarily, the loss or damage by fire is the difference between the
value of the building before the fire and the value of what remains
after the fire, and that difference is to be regarded as the true loss
covered by the policy, unless there be in the policy some language by
which some element of that difference is excluded. Where the build-
ing is only partially destroyed, and the proper course is to repair.., it
is manifest that in estimating the value of the part remaining the cost
of the necessary repairs is a very material matter; and, if the repairs
must conform to certain legal requirements, the nature of those
requirements is also to be considered.' 24
Thus, according to the court, the language of the insurance policies
themselves determine the general measure of damages. 125 Only one of
the policies at issue in the case contained an Ordinance or Law type
exclusion.1 26 The court determined that the costs associated with the
building laws should be included in the general measure of damages
under the policies which did not contain an exclusion.' 27 The court rea-
soned that:
The building laws were the same at the time of the fire as at the time
the policies were issued. The only change in the situation was in the
physical condition of the building, and that change was caused
wholly by the fire. The building laws simply constituted one of the
conditions of the situation. While it is true that by reason of [the]
existence [of the building laws,] the loss caused by the ravages of the
fire was greater than it otherwise would have been, it is none the less
true that the sole operating cause of the change in the building was
the fire, and, . . . in the absence of any provision in the policy
expressly excluding from the damages the part arising out of that
condition, that part is not to be excluded, but is to be regarded as
primarily the result of the fire, or as "loss or damage by fire."' 121
The court discussed and adopted the reasoning of the Michigan
123. Id. at 62-63.
124. Id. at 63.
125. Id. The court called this policy the "Pawtucket Policy." It is discussed in further detail
below.
126. Id. These policies incorporated the "Massachusetts Standard" form which contained a
harmless "loss settlement" type provision. This provision provided that:
In the case of any loss or damage, the company... shall either pay the amount for
which it shall be liable, which amount, if not agreed upon, shall be ascertained by
award of referees as hereinafter provided, or replace the property with other of the
same kind and goodness, or it may... notify the insured of its intention to rebuild
or repair the premises.
Id.
127. Id. The court described the defendants position as "untenable." Id.
128. Id. at 63-64.
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Supreme Court in Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co. 129 The Brady court
held that "where an ordinance prevent[s] the repair of a building which
[has] been practically destroyed by fire, the loss [is] total, although the
cost of restoring the building to its original condition would [be] much
less than the amount of the insurance.' 3 0 The court noted that other
jurisdictions have qualifiedly 13 ' adopted the following proposition,
which is generally regarded as the constructive total loss doctrine:
[W]here the law prohibits the repair of a building which has been
partially destroyed by fire, in the absence of any express provision in
the policy to the contrary[,] the loss is not measured by the sum
required to restore the building to its condition before the fire, but it
is total.132
Thus, in Hewins, the plaintiffs were entitled to the costs associated with
the building laws because the change in the building was brought about
solely as a result of the fire and because the policies did not contain an
Ordinance or Law exclusion. 133 The court added that the principal is the
same regardless of whether the application of the building laws results in
a total loss or whether they merely increase the cost of a partial loss.' 3 4
On the other hand, the court enforced the exclusion included in the
Pawtucket policy and determined that the insurer was not liable for the
increased costs associated with the building laws. 135 The court noted
two separate provisions in the Pawtucket policy which provided that the
insurer's liability "shall in no event exceed what it would cost the
insured to repair or replace the same with material of like kind and qual-
ity"' 3 6 and that the insurer would not be liable "beyond the actual value
destroyed by fire for loss occasioned by ordinance or law regulating
construction or repair of buildings."1 37 The court reasoned that:
[S]uch portion of the damage caused by the change in the condition
of the building as arises from the existence of the building laws,
whether regarded as a condition or a cause, is not to be considered as
a loss or damage by fire, but is to be excluded from consideration,
and the loss is to be estimated as if there were no building laws
affecting the situation.' 31
129. Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., II Mich. 425 (1863).
130. Hewins v. London Assur. Corp., 68 N.E. at 63.
131. As discussed below, an Ordinance or Law exclusion is generally regarded as
unenforceable in states with Valued Policy laws if a municipal authority prevents the repair of a
partial loss.
132. Id. at 64.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Several jurisdictions have used the constructive total loss doctrine
to limit the applicability of the Ordinance or Law exclusion. 3 9 In Fein-
bloom v. Camden Fire Insurance Ass 'n,140 the plaintiff's building, val-
ued at more than the $18,000.00 for which it was insured, sustained
$12,600.00 worth of damage.' 41 A local ordinance prevented repair of
the building unless the entire building was brought up to code.142 The
policy stated that the insurer would pay the actual cash value "without
allowance for any increased cost of repair or reconstruction by reason of
any ordinance or law regulating construction or repair. '' 14  The court
held that the building was a constructive total loss and ordered it demol-
ished because the remaining portion of the building "could not be
'restored' in a manner which would comply with the ordinances...."
The court stated that "the general rule is that if 'by reason of public
regulations rebuilding is prohibited the loss is total, although some por-
tion of the building remains which might otherwise have been available
in rebuilding.' 1145 The court reasoned:
[t]his language does not exclude liability for a constructive total loss
.... It must be noted that the language does not say that the compa-
nies shall not be liable for loss caused by the operation of ordinance
or law, but merely that no allowance will be made for the increased
cost of repairing or reconstructing that loss. In other words, this lan-
guage does not relate to the definition of a total (or partial) loss, nor
to the exclusions from coverage. In short, we must first determine
whether the loss was total or partial. If it is partial, the amount for
which the company is liable may not be more than the "cost to repair
or replace ... with material of like kind or quality ... without allow-
ance for any increased cost of repair... by reason of any ordinance
.... When we say the loss is total we mean that reconstruction or
repair is impossible, and then [the exclusion] does not apply for there
is nothing to which to add 'increased cost.' a146
The court relied upon the "Loss Settlement" language in the policy
("without allowance for any increased cost... by reason of any ordi-
nance or law") 47 to render the Ordinance or Law exclusion inapplica-
ble. The court reasoned that where the loss is total, repairs are not
139. See, e.g., Stahlberg v. Travelers Indem. Co., 568 S.W. 2d 79, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(listing jurisdictions which follow the constructive total loss rule: Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin).
140. 149 A.2d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1959).
141. Id. at 618.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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permitted; therefore, there is nothing to which increased costs may be
added.1 48 The court noted the distinction between the language which
appeared in the "Exceptions" section, which dealt with what was cov-
ered, and the language in the "Loss Settlement" section, which related
only to "what the company will pay for what is covered."' 49 The
defendant's reliance on Hewins v. London Assurance Corp., a case
which upheld the exclusion, was misplaced because the language in that
case was contained in the "exceptions" section and provided that the
company would not be liable "for loss occasioned by ordinance or laws
"150
In Stahlberg v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 5 ' the insured's building
was partially destroyed by fire. A municipal order was issued for the
demolition of the building pursuant to a local ordinance which prohib-
ited its repair. ' 52 The court stated that under the doctrine of constructive
total loss, a building is considered a total loss if it is damaged to the
extent that "no substantial remnant remains that a prudent uninsured per-
son would use on rebuilding."' 5 3 In addition, if municipal authorities
prohibit the repair of a damaged structure, the insured is entitled to
recover on the basis of a total loss as a matter of law.' 54 Therefore, the
court held that the insured suffered a total loss by reason of the demoli-
tion order.' 55 The court reasoned that the local ordinance was not the
cause of the loss; rather, it merely recognized that the loss was total.' 56
B. Florida's "Valued Policy" Law
Under the valued policy law, a total loss, whether actual or con-
structive, entitles the policy holder to collect the face amount of the pol-
icy. In many cases, a valued policy law is crucial to the issue of whether
an insurer is liable for a total-in-law' 5 7 loss.' 58 Courts in which valued
policy statutes exist have uniformly held that total-in-law losses are cov-
148. Id.
149. Id. at 619.
150. Id.
151. 568 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
152. Id. at 82. The ordinance provided that non-conforming use buildings that have been
damaged by more than sixty percent are not to be restored unless it restored to a conforming use.
The court noted that had if the building been in conforming use at the time of the fire, it could
have been restored. Id. at 82 n. 1.
153. Id. at 84.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 84-85.
156. Id. at 85.
157. A total-in-law loss results when an ordinance or law contributes to the loss to the extent
that it renders the loss total as opposed to a total-in-fact loss that is a total loss caused solely by
actual physical damage.
158. In cases where there is no valued policy law, jurisdictions are split. See, e.g., Fidelity &
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ered despite an exclusion in the policy to the contrary.159 Thus, Ordi-
nance or Law exclusions have been held inapplicable when they conflict
with a valued policy statute. 16°
Florida's valued policy statute provides that:
(1) In the event of the total loss of any building [or] structure ... as
to a covered peril ... the insurer's liability, if any, under the policy
for such total loss shall be in the amount of money for which such
property was so insured as specified in the policy and for which a
premium has been charged and paid.
(2) In the case of a partial loss by fire or lightning of any prop-
erty, the insurer's liability, if any, under the policy shall be for the
actual amount of such loss. 16 1
The statute, in effect, operates like a liquidated damage clause when the
insured's loss is deemed total, thus making it unnecessary for the insured
to prove the value of the loss.' 62 The statute also prevents overinsurance
because it discourages insurance companies from collecting premiums
on overvalued property and then contesting the value of the property
when it is in their best interests to do so.' 63
In Hart v. North British & Merchantile Ins. Co., the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that an agreement to let the loss be adjusted by
arbitration is invalid as against the valued policy laws.' 64 In Hart, the
court rejected the insurer's argument that the state insurance commis-
sioner had approved a form to provide additional protection for an addi-
tional premium to cover total-in-law losses because the argument
violated the purposes of the statute. 65 Presumably, this reasoning
would also prevent an insurer from successfully arguing that the insured
had declined to purchase the Ordinance or Law endorsement which
would have provided coverage for losses.
For example, in Stevick,166 the insured's policy contained a provi-
sion that specifically excluded coverage for a loss resulting from a con-
demnation order. 167 The court held that, under the valued policy law,
such an exclusion was unenforceable when the insured suffered a total
Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Mondzelewski, 115 A.2d 697, 699 (Del. 1955); Hewins v. London Assurance
Corp., 68 N.E. 62 (Mass. 1903).
159. See, e.g., Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Mondzelewski, 115 A.2d 697 (Del. 1955); Hart v.
North British & Merchantile Ins. Co., 162 So. 177 (La. 1935).
160. Id.
161. FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (1993) (emphasis added).
162. See Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So. 2d 780, 783-84 (Fla. 1964);
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 490 So. 2d 149, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
163. Stevick v. Northwest G. F. Mut. Ins. Co., 281 N.W.2d 60, 63 (N.D. 1979).
164. Hart v. North British & Merchantile Ins. Co., 162 So. 177, 181 (La. 1935).
165. Id. at 180.
166. 281 N.W.2d 60 (N.D. 1979).
167. Id. at 62.
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loss, whether the loss was "total in fact" or "total in law."' 68 The court
reasoned that where the loss is deemed total, any exclusion that attempts
to limit the liability of an insurer to less than the face amount of an
insurance policy is contrary to the valued policy statute and, therefore,
void. 169
C. Specific Hurricane Related Issues
1. PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A homeowner who is required to elevate his or her home must lift
the home's foundation as well as the portion of the home that remains
undamaged or that can be utilized in rebuilding. As a practical matter,
however, there is considerable question whether the elevation process
can be completed without injuring the foundation or the remaining por-
tion of the building. Although courts vary in their methods of determin-
ing whether a constructive total loss has occurred, the two most widely
utilized have been identified as the "Usable Remnant" and "Loss of
Identity" rules.' 70
The following definitions are helpful:
Loss of Identity: A total loss has been sustained whenever the build-
ing has been so injured as to lose its identity and specific character.
Usable Remnant: A total loss has not been sustained so long as a
substantial remnant remains which a prudent uninsured person would
use in rebuilding.
A total loss has been sustained wherever the building has been so
damaged that in effect it has lost its identity as a building, and that
even though certain parts which remain may be made use of, if the
work which is required must be looked upon as construction rather
than repair, the loss must be considered as total. 17
1
Where there is a question as to whether a building can be adequately
repaired using the remnants that remain, some courts are quick to find a
constructive total loss, refusing to place an insured in the precarious
position of bearing the risk of defects manifesting themselves in the
future. In Occhipinti v. Boston Ins. Co., there was a possibility that if
the building was repaired using the existing walls and foundation,
defects could manifest themselves in the future.172 The court acknowl-
edged the Loss of Identity rule for purposes of a constructive total loss,
However, it fashioned a variation which took into account the situation
"where there remains standing and in place sufficient parts of the build-
168. Id. at 62.
169. Id. at 63.
170. Occhipinti v. Boston Ins. Co., 72 So. 2d 326, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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ing and foundations to justify the belief that the owner, if he had no
insurance, would probably have used those parts, but that there is never-
theless a fair possibility that defects might later develop. ' I 3 The court
stated the rule that a "constructive total loss has occurred either when the
building has been so damaged as to lose its identity, or has been so
nearly completely destroyed that a reasonably prudent owner would not
care to take the chance of using those parts which remain standing."' 174
The court also reasoned that:
an insured owner in such a case is entitled to be made whole and that
he is not made whole when there is reasonably remote possibility that
at sometime in the future he may be called upon to repair defects
resulting from the occurrence of the hazard against which he has
purchased insurance. In such a case he has sustained at least a con-
structive total loss and is entitled to recover for such loss. 175
The same reasoning was adopted in Reliance Ins. Co. v. Orleans
Parish Sch. Bd.,' 76 where the district court applied the Usable Remnant
rule to a building damaged over 75% and determined that the remnants
left standing after the fire were not usable in the restoration of the build-
ing.17 7 The court, citing Occhipinti, stated that even if an attempt were
made to use the remaining 25%, "there would be no guarantee of the
structural integrity of the restored building. The [insured] is not required
to assume this risk."'7 8 Consequently, the court held that the building
was a total loss.' 79
Additionally, in Sensat v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,180 the
court adopted and restated the entire holding and reasoning of Occhipinti
and held that since there was a reasonable possibility that the foundation
of the plaintiff's home had sustained heat damage from fire, "the insured
should not be forced to assume the risk of such hidden dangers."' 81
2. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
To many homeowners affected by the hurricane and the elevation
requirement, compliance with an ordinance or law is a financial impossi-
bility. Moreover, irrespective of the ability to pay for the elevation, it
may be cheaper, wiser, and more practical to just demolish the home and
173. Id.
174. Id. at 330.
175. Id. at 332-33.
176. 201 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La. 1962).
177. Id. at 80.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 176 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
181. Id. at 806.
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build a new one. In such a case the loss should be considered a total
lOSS.182
Where a building or structure is only partially destroyed, courts
have considered the cost of repairs, particularly in relation to whether it
would be cheaper to repair or to demolish and reconstruct, when deter-
mining whether there was a total loss. In The Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The
Port Clinton Fish Co., 83 a fish house and a portion of an attached dock
were destroyed by fire. Apparently, the dock was more valuable than
the structure. Testimony established that in order to rebuild the dock,
the remaining undamaged portion would have to be removed. It was
also established that the materials dismantled could be utilized in
rebuilding the dock.'8 4 The court held, however, that because the cost of
saving and utilizing the remaining portion of the dock (the dismantled
materials) would be greater than the value of those materials, the loss
was a total loss.' 85
In Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia Contributorship,18 6 a case
which dealt with the increased cost of repairs brought about by an ordi-
nance, the plaintiff's building was partially damaged by fire. A city
ordinance, however, required that the width of the building's walls be of
a greater thickness." 7 Although compliance costs doubled, the cost of
repairing the building, the market value of the building remained the
same.' 8   The court, in discussing the measure of damages, questioned
whether the proper measure would be to calculate the damages as
including those repair costs "existing and lawfully imposed at the time
when the fire occurred."' 19 The court refused to calculate the damages
according to what it would cost to repair the building in the same condi-
tion as it was before the fire without regard to the requirements of the
ordinance. 190 The court reasoned by analogy that material costs would
be based on the market price at the time of the fire and not on what those
costs were or would have been at the time of signing the insurance con-
182. See Harvey v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 689, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (holding
that "[e]ven though the building was not totally consumed by fire, it was so damaged as not to be
economically repairable").
183. 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 468, 469 (Cir. Ct. 1897).
184. Id. at 471.
185. Id. at 473.
186. 51 A. 351 (Pa. 1902).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 351-52. This fact negates the ostensible purpose put forth by the insurance industry
that the purpose of the Ordinance or Law exclusion is to prevent the insured from gaining a
windfall. If this is in fact the purpose of the exclusion, then the courts should not enforce the
exclusion when it is determined that the insured would not benefit or gain by the application of the
ordinance.
189. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
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tract.' 91 The court stated that an insurance contract should be interpreted
according to the changed conditions when determining the amount of the
loss and that "such a principle would not involve the insuring company
in any loss greater in extent than that which it undertook to assume when
the policy was made."' 92
In Kinzer v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 93 the insured's building was
partially destroyed and the insurer, who had attempted repairs, was pre-
vented from doing so by the city because of a newly-enacted ordinance
that required that the building contain fireproof materials. 94 The trial
court had determined that it would be cheaper to tear down the building
than to attempt to utilize the materials or portions that were not dam-
aged.' 95 The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed and stated that:
[N]o matter how great a portion of the building may remain uncon-
sumed, yet if it is so injured that it must be torn down, or that what
remains cannot be utilized in reconstructing the building without
incurring greater expense than if it were not so utilized, the property
must be regarded as [a total loss].' 96
3. PRIOR CONDITION: INSURER ASSUMED THE RISK
The insurance companies, most of whom underwrite flood insur-
ance policies and all of whom are familiar with the fifty percent rule,
price their policies according to the risk involved. In evaluating the risk,
insurance companies consider several factors including the elevation of
an insured's home. Consequently, a home that was situated below the
required elevation constituted a "substandard condition" of which the
insurers were aware, and therefore they assumed the risk of insuring
homes that were below the required flood level and subject to the fifty
percent rule.
The defective or poor condition of a building that existed prior to a
loss and which ultimately contributed to its total loss by the refusal of
authorities to allow the building to be rebuilt has been held to be a con-
structive total loss and a risk assumed by the insurer. In Monteleone v.
Royal Ins. Co. Of Liverpool & London,'97 a building described as old,
frail and unsafe was "injured" by a fire.' 98 The city authorities refused
to issue a building permit and ordered the building demolished based in
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 127 P. 762 (Kan. 1912).
194. Id. at 763.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 764.
197. 18 So. 472 (La. 1895).
198. Id. at 472.
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part on the damaged portion and the condition of the undamaged por-
tion.199 The insurer argued that the building could have been repaired
and that its liability should be measured by those repairs.200 The court
noted the "mass of testimony" regarding the impracticability of such
repairs, the efficacy of such repairs if made or attempted, the large
expense associated with the repairs, and testimony that even with the
proposed repairs the building would still be unsafe. 20 ' The court, in dis-
cussing the measure of damages, stated:
A total loss may be claimed though the walls of a building stand, and
the elements that composed it be not entirely consumed. It is the
same, we think, when the insured building cannot be made secure by
repairs. Nor will it make any difference, in such cases of constructive
total loss, that the condition after the fire is due in part to causes
existing before. Such causes are deemed the remote, not the proxi-
mate, causes of the loss. The insurer, taking a risk on an old, and in
this instance an insecure, building, incurs the obligation to pay for a
total loss if the injuries by the fire, combined with the antecedent
defects, make repairs impracticable. The value of the old building at
the time of the fire is the measure of indemnity promised by the
policy. 2 02
In Rutherford v. Royal Ins. Co.,203 a case which involved a policy
that contained an Ordinance or Law exclusion,2 4 the court followed the
reasoning in Monteleone regarding prior existing defects, and held the
insurer liable for the total loss where the city ordered the demolition of
the building after a fire. The court so held, despite the exclusion 2 5 and
the insurer's argument that the fire did not cause the loss but merely
revealed the defective condition. The court stated:
if, because of the antecedent condition, the fire did cause a total loss,
by rendering the building unfit for occupancy and incapable of being
repaired, the defendants would be liable as upon a total loss, even
though it should appear that, but for the antecedent weakened and
199. Id. at 473.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 12 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1926).
204. Id. at 881. The exclusion provided that the insurer will pay "but not exceeding the
amount which it would cost to repair or replace the same with material of like kind and quality...
without allowance for any increased cost of repair or reconstruction by reason of any ordinance or
law, regulating construction or repair . I..." Id.
205. Id. at 880-81. The court acknowledged and adopted the rule that where a public authority
prevents the repair of a structure, a constructive total loss results. The court dismissed the
defendants' contention that the rule did not apply to this case because the "condition which
brought about the destruction of the building and prevented its repair was not the result of the fire,
but of conditions existing prior thereto." Id. at 881.
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impaired condition, the fire would not have produced such result.2 °6
In such a case, the court noted, "it makes no difference that the condition
after the fire is due in part to causes existing before."20 7 The court rea-
soned that "but for the fire, [the building] would have continued to have
value as rentable property, and if it was so damaged by the fire that it
ceased to have any value whatever, the fire was the proximate cause of
the loss, the producing cause, without which it would not have
occurred."2 °8
4. THE ORDINANCE OR LAW AS PART OF THE CONTRACT
The Dade County Code and South Florida Building Code were
enacted so that Dade County could participate in the national flood pro-
gram. That program was developed presumably to assist the states in
providing for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. It is unques-
tioned that the county has the right and, as some would hold, the obliga-
tion to adopt and enact such laws. To allow the insurance companies to
exclude compliance with such laws from coverage, would be to allow
them to circumvent the purpose and intent of the law. Florida should not
allow the insurance companies to engage in private lawmaking about
matters of profound public importance. Florida should require that
insurance companies write policies that reflect adherence to the laws of
the state.
Several courts have stated that the actual ordinance or law is itself a
part of the insurance contract. It has been stated that although an insur-
ance policy is a matter of contract, "when parties enter an insurance
contract which is surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements,
they are presumed to have entered into the contract with reference to the
statute, and the statute thus becomes part of the contract. '20 9
Although the language cited by the courts specifically refers to the
"parties," the courts have sided with the insureds on public policy
grounds by stating that the exclusion contravenes the ordinance or
law. 10
D. The Florida Courts
Florida appears to have initially adopted the constructive total loss
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 882.
209. Hertog v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 415 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Larkin v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 83 N.W. 409, 410 (Minn. 1900)); see also Stahlberg v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 568 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 295
S.W. 847, 850 (Mo. Ct. App. (1927).
210. Hertog, 415 N.W.2d at 373.
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doctrine in Citizens Ins. Co. v. Barnes,2 1 a case that was decided in
1929. In that case, a wood frame building was partially damaged by
fire, but a city ordinance prevented its repair because it was damaged to
the extent of 50% of what it would cost to build a similar building.212
The insurer argued that since the building was only partially damaged, it
was liable only for the cost of repairs. The court held, however, that the
building was a constructive total loss after adopting the rule that where a
building "cannot be repaired, because of a city ordinance ... a recovery
may be had for a total loss. '2 13 In addition, the court adopted the rule
that "where parties contract upon a subject which is surrounded by statu-
tory limitations and requirements, they are presumed to have entered
into their engagements with reference to such statute, and the same
enters into and becomes a part of the contract." '214 Consequently, the
court held that the parties are presumed to know of the ordinance which
"directly and materially affect[s] their rights" and that such ordinance
"should govern and control in the adjustment and settlement of such
lOSS. ' ' 215
The doctrine's applicability to the Ordinance or Law exclusion was
first tested in Florida in Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Fowler,2 16 where, pursu-
ant to the exclusion, the insurer would not be liable for "increased costs
of repair or construction by reason of any ordinance or law regulating
construction or repair. '' 2 17 The plaintiff's building was partially
destroyed by fire, but a city ordinance prevented its repair and conse-
quently the city ordered the building demolished. 21 8 The insured argued
that the fire was the cause of the condition that lead to the demolition of
the building and that under the valued policy laws, the insurer was liable
for the face amount of the policy. 219 The insurer argued that it should
not be liable for the total loss because the building was only partially
damaged and that its total destruction was caused by the operation of the
ordinance or law, the coverage of which is specifically excluded in the
policy.220 Furthermore, the insurer argued that the valued policy statute
required a "total loss by fire" and that since the plaintiff's building was
only "partially destroyed by fire" liability should be limited to the esti-
211. 124 So. 722 (Fla. 1929).
212. Id. at 722-23.
213. Id. at 723-24.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 181 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
217. Id. at 693.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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mated cost of repair.221 The court, although not specifically mentioning
a constructive total loss, held that where the city prevents the repair of a
building, the loss is deemed a total loss. Under the valued policy law,
the insurer was liable for the face amount of the policy.222
In Regency Baptist Temple v. Insurance Co. of N.A.,2 23 a portion of
the insured's roof collapsed due to standing water which had accumu-
lated because of the faulty construction of the roof.224 Pursuant to a city
ordinance, the city refused to issue a permit unless the entire roof was
replaced.225 The court held that under the policy, which contained an
Ordinance or Law exclusion,226 the insurer was not liable for that por-
tion of the roof that did not collapse. Of great significance, however, is
the fact that the court noted that the "rule is otherwise when, in the case
of [total] loss byfire or lightning, such a provision conflicts with Flor-
ida's valued policy law, Section 627.702, Florida Statutes (J975).'"227
This statement is significant in that the current valued policy statute
eliminated "total loss by fire or lightning" and replaced it with "total
loss ... as to a covered peril.'228 Therefore, it would appear that if the
case were decided today, based solely under the current statute, the court
might render the roof a total loss under the valued policy statute and
require the insurer to pay for the entire replacement of the roof.
The court added, however, that the facts of this case should be dis-
tinguished from those cases where the ordinance prevented the repair of
the damaged building. In those cases, the court noted, the buildings
were deemed a constructive total loss and the insurer was liable for the
total amount of the loss. 229
In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Harris,23 the parties were in the process of
determining the amount of the insured's loss when the city condemned
the building as a safety hazard and demolished it.23' The court adopted
the rule in Regency, that "a building will be considered a 'constructive
total loss,' and the insurer liable for the building's entire value, under
circumstances where an ordinance prevents repair. '232 Consequently,
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 352 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
224. Id. at 1243.
225. Id.
226. Id. The exclusion provided that coverage would be excluded for loss "[o]ccasioned
directly or indirectly by enforcement of any local or state ordinance or law regulating the
construction, repair or demolition of buildings or structures." Id. at 1244.
227. Id. at 1244 (emphasis added).
228. FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (1992) (as amended in 1982) (emphasis added).
229. Regency, 352 So. 2d at 1244.
230. 503 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
231. Id. at 1322.
232. Id. at 1323.
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the court held that the insured suffered a constructive total loss.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The combined effects of Hurricane Andrew and the Ordinance or
Law exclusion demand judicial intervention. The courts in Florida
should adopt the reasonable expectation doctrine and Restatement sec-
tion 211, and apply the efficient proximate cause rule and the construc-
tive total loss doctrine to the situation in south Dade County, Florida.
These doctrines have gained considerable support and could provide the
courts in Florida with sound principles upon which to base their rulings
and allow the courts to prevent insurance companies from escaping their
obligations to rebuild those homes destroyed by Hurricane Andrew.
HUGH L. WOOD, JR.
